This blog has been around since my graduate student days. I recently cleaned it up and, out of hundreds of posts, kept only those that still seemed worth preserving. The remaining posts are therefore not representative of the blog’s original tone, style or range. New posts will continue to be rare, but the archive will remain online.
Blog
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How to define nihilism: Universal vs. egalitarian nihilism
I don’t know what nihilism is and how to distinguish it from similar views. For example, I don’t know for sure what the difference is between the nihilistic “nothing is good or bad so I just do what brings me pleasure” and the hedonistic “I just do what brings me pleasure because in the end nothing is really good or bad”. But it seems to me that there are, at a fundamental level, two different ways of defining nihilism.
Nihilism can either be an equality thesis: With respect to value or meaning everything is equal. Neither meaningful/insignificant nor good/bad allow us to draw any differences in the world because everything has the same meaning or value.
Alternatively, nihilism can be a universality thesis: Everything is meaningless or valueless. No matter where you look you won’t find any meaning or value. (more…)
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Ignorance and Optimism – On Rosling’s “Factfulness”, part 2
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Ignorance and Optimism – On Rosling’s “Factfulness”
Hans Rosling with Ola Rosling and Anna Rosling Rönnlund: Factfulness. Ten Reasons We’re Wrong About the World – And Why Things Are Better Than You Think. London: Sceptre, 2018.
Rosling’s Factfulness popped up in my filter bubble several times and since two topics dear to my heart – ignorance and optimism – surface a lot in his book, I just had to read it with my philosophical glasses on. This isn’t a full review – the book is a nice read and I can certainly recommend it! –, just some comments on what Rosling has to say about ignorance and optimism. In a nutshell, Rosling argues that we (= adults from developed, level 4 countries) are mostly ignorant about the current state of the world, in particular about population growth, poverty, education, gender differences and health. This claim is based on a survey of 12,000 participants from 14 countries in which most participants consistently choose an option that represents the world as worse than it actually is. For example, most participants think that 50% or less of the world’s children are vaccinated against at least one disease – despite the correct answer being 80%. We aren’t just ignorant – we suffer from a pessimistic illusion! (more…)
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New draft “How (not) to respond to Putnam’s brain in a vat argument”
Among students and colleagues I’m known for defending Putnam’s brain in a vat argument against all comers, be it incredulous stares or heated objections. Although I’m still a big fan of it, I have come to the conclusion that scepticism can escape it after all. (Some may think that was obvious all along. Alas, for me that is a new insight.) I started writing the paper with the intention to explain why sceptical scenario must not mess with memory, but couldn’t find a convincing reason to ban memory-alteration from sceptical scenarios. Unfortunately, Putnam’s argument is powerless against recent memory-altering envatment. After some tweaking of this scenario, I ended up with a scenario that is sufficiently radical for a successful sceptical argument, or so it seems to me. – As always comments are very welcome! But please don’t cite without asking for the latest version.
Paper: PDF
Keywords: Cartesian scepticism · Putnam · brains in a vat · constraints on sceptical scenarios · scepticism and content externalism · memory
Abstract: Putnam’s argument that we are not brains in a vat has recently seen a resurgence in interest. Although objections to it are legion, an emerging consensus seems to be that even if it successfully refutes one version of the scenario, lifelong envatment, it is powerless against the recent envatment version of the scenario. Although initially appealing, this strategy generates problems of its own. In this paper I argue that merely switching to recent envatment is indeed a bad response to Putnam’s argument, yet there is a different version, recent memory-altering envatment, that Putnam’s argument does not refute and is also sufficiently radical. The crucial issue turns out to be which epistemic sources sceptical scenarios may attack. It is argued that there is no convincing reason for exempting memory from the sceptical attack. Putnam’s argument does not fail because of some ‘deep’ philosophical mistake, but because it overlooks how flexible and adjustable sceptical scenarios are.
Update: Slides (Issues in Philosophy of Memory, July 2017, Cologne)
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Philosophie im Straßenverkehr, heute: Supererogation
Dem großartigen Vorbild Eike von Savignys folgend (Die Signalsprache der Autofahrer, 1980) glaube ich, dass sich so ziemlich jedes interessante philosophische Thema sehr passend mit Beispielen aus dem Straßenverkehr erklären lässt. Jedenfalls kenne ich noch kein Gegenbeispiel… Thema diesmal: Supererogation und Supererogationslöcher. (more…)
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Upcoming talk “Optimism and the Value of Truth” (GAP.9)
Together with Christian Wirrwitz I will give a talk at GAP.9 next week (Tuesday 14:15): “Optimism and the Value of Truth”. Our starting point is a type of conversation we probably all have taken part in several times in our lives (both in the role of A and in the role of B): A and B are talking about some episode of their past or future lives. A paints it black, B reprimands A for being such a pessimist. A replies that she is not a pessimist, but a realist. Three observations about this type of conversation are important to us:
- Optimism is assumed to be good, at least by B.
- Having true beliefs (aka realism) is assumed to be good, at least by A.
- These two values are assumed to clash with each other, otherwise A’s reply wouldn’t make sense.
Drawing on several ideas (self-fulfilment and feedback loops, semantic indeterminacy, rejection of uniqueness/underdetermination principle) we offer an explanation of how optimists can value truth and need not be epistemically irrational.
For the full show come along on Tuesday (or have a chat with us at GAP.9)!
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Ein F mit G ist ein F
DR hat mich heute mit einer Frage überrascht. Folgt aus “a ist ein F mit (einem) G” logisch “a ist ein F”? Er meint Nein. Manche Beispielargumente dieser Form seien nicht folgerichtig, andere zwar folgerichtig, aber dann begrifflich und nicht logisch folgerichtig. Beispiele:
(1) Das ist ein Tee mit einem Stück Zucker. Also ist das ein Tee.
(2) Das ist ein Haus mit einem Schornstein. Also ist das ein Haus.
(3) Das ist eine Festplatte mit 200GB. Also ist das eine Festplatte. (more…)
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Einhörner, bewarzte Hände und ein déjà vu
Letztens hatte ich ein kurioses déjà-vu-Erlebnis: Vielleicht erinnert sich noch jemand an meinen Post “Könnten alle meine (Außenwelt-) Meinungen falsch sein?”, in dem ich ein Beispiel vorstelle: (more…)
