I am a sceptic. I am less sure, however, about the best way to formulate the view. One possibility is semantic: “know” has all the hallmarks of an incoherent concept, so that the question “What do we know?” may fall somewhere between ambiguous and meaningless. Another is metaphysical: maybe we simply do not know anything. A third is therapeutic: knowledge might not matter very much, in the sense that it is neither a useful guide to action nor a goal of science.
In my published work, however, I remain neutral on whether scepticism is true. Instead, I analyse sceptical arguments, the assumptions on which they depend, and different ways of responding to them.
My papers
- “Scepticism, Infallibilism, Fallibilism.” Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2012), pp. 49–70. PhilPapers · PDF
- “Überzeugung und Wahrheit.” Review of Jochen Briesen, Skeptische Paradoxa. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60(5) (2012), pp. 821–825. DOI · PhilPapers
- “Sceptical Scenarios Are Not Error-Possibilities.” Erkenntnis 78 (2013), pp. 59–72. DOI · PhilPapers
- “Defending the Ignorance View of Sceptical Scenarios.” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (2015), pp. 269–295. DOI · PhilPapers
- “Brains in a Vat and Memory: How (Not) to Respond to Putnam’s Argument.” Belgrade Philosophical Annual 33 (2020), pp. 39–53. DOI · PhilPapers · PDF
